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SHARDS OF CITIZENSHIP, SHARDS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY: ON THE CONTINUED 
USEFULNESS OF AN OLD VOCABULARY 
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITU-
TION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. 
By T. Alexander Aleinikoff. 1 Harvard University Press. 
2002. ix + 301 pp. $48.00.2 
Sanford Levinson3 
I agreed to review this excellent book some two years ago, 
shortly after it came out; the pressure of other commitments led 
me to take much longer completing my task than I had intended. 
However, almost all clouds have silver linings; my delay has en-
abled me, upon rereading the book, both to see new implications 
in 2004 that I might have missed in early 2002 and, therefore, to 
weigh differently some of Aleinikoff's arguments. His topic, 
which is "sovereignty" and its "semblances," is at the forefront 
of both much current public debate and discussion by scholars 
interested in both the theory and practice of politics or of legal 
systems. But he is also vitally interested in examining the mean-
ings (and importance) that we ascribe to citizenship; indeed, he 
offers as one of his central purposes to "decenter" the relevance 
of citizenship to enjoying relatively full membership in the 
American legal order. Both topics are of great-and ever 
stronger-interest to me.4 
1. Dean, Georgetown University Law Center. 
2. It is regrettable that the Harvard University Press has not yet brought out a pa-
perback edition. This is a book that very much deserves to be on the shelves of any seri-
ous student of American constitutional development, and it would make a fine assign-
ment in a seminar-but not at $48. 
3. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law 
University of Texas Law School. As always, I am grateful to Jack Balkin for his respons~ 
to an earlier draft of this review. 
4. I myself have written on the importance we should (or should not) ascribe to 
citizenship in SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 104-06 (1988), and Sanford 
Levinson, Suffrage And Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 545 (1989). 
Sovereignty IS at the heart of the issues examined in Sanford Levinson, "Perpetual Un-
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But one can scarcely be uninfluenced in the consideration of 
such issues by ever-forward movement by the United States into 
a presumably endless "war on terrorism." Crucial to that war is 
the continuing importance (or lack of same) of such analytic 
concepts like "sovereignty," especially if we emphasize the 
"Westphalian" definition of sovereignty as the inviolability of 
national borders. Perhaps even more to the point, we are 
pressed, almost daily, to emphasize the importance of differenti-
ating between friend and foe with regard to the conduct of that 
war (including, of course, deciding which national borders have 
lost their presumptive inviolability). One finds grim corrobora-
tion for the German5 political philosopher Carl Schmitt insight 
that politics "can be understood ... in the context of the ever 
present possibility of the friend-and-enemy grouping."6 I elided 
the one word "only," for I am certainly suspicious of reducing all 
of politics to the singular context of the grouping of "friend-and-
enemy." But this is not to deny that the perceived presence of a 
ion," "Free Love," And Secession: On The Limits To The "Consent Of The Governed", 
39 TULSA L. REV. 457 (2004). See also Sanford Levinson, Torture In Iraq & The Rule Of 
Law In America, DAEDALUS, Summer 2004, at 5-8. 
5. Schmitt was also a member of the nazi party who wrote some central legal 
apologetics for the coming to power by Hitler. Even if one accepts the genetic fallacy 
with regard to evaluating ideas by reference to the identity of the person(s) proposing 
them, one might, as Brian Bix suggested in responding to an earlier draft of this review, 
take into account Schmitt's actual behavior and political commitments "as arguable evi-
dence of what [his] sometimes obscure ideas really meant or really led to." There is an 
increasingly extensive literature on Schmitt and the degree to which his ideas should be 
taken seriously by political and legal theorists. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, 
BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURTER SCHOOL AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (1994); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT: THE END OF LAW 
(1999); DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS 
KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997). Suffice it to say that I think we 
ignore Schmitt's potential relevance at our peril. This may speak not so well of Schmitt as 
of the extent to which our present political situation is increasingly reminiscent of Wei-
mar. A full discussion of this point is obviously well beyond the scope of this review. 
6. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 35 (1976), as quoted in 
Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt And The Paradox Of Liberal Democracy, in LAW As 
POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 168 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 
1998). I have elsewhere suggested that anyone seeking to understand the jurisprudential 
(and perhaps constitutional) crisis generated by the Bush Administration's legal invoca-
tion of the war on terrorism should be familiar with Schmitt's thought. See Sanford Lev-
inson, Torture In Iraq & The Rule Of Law In America, DAEDALUS, Summer 2004, at 8. I 
mean this partly as critique, but also as recognition that Schmitt, with his emphasis on the 
destabilization of "normal" law by the exception, i.e., the state of emergency, is a thinker 
who must be confronted rather than simply dismissed. Consider only the use made of the 
"compelling interest" within American constitutional law as a means to avoid compliance 
with what otherwise looks, at least to the na'ive reader, like an unequivocal textual com-
mand. Interestingly enough, Aleinikoff made his initial reputation through an attack 
published in The Yale Law Journal on the promiscuous use of "balancing tests" in consti-
tutional law. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitwional Law in The Age Of Balancing, 
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
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true enemy, like the prospect of one's death (with which, of 
course, it is connected) tends to clarify the mind and, inevitably, 
to influence the kinds of politics seen in any given situation. 
"Friend-and-enemy" can take many forms; for all too many, on 
occasion, the categories of "friend-and-enemy" seem to invite 
the use as proxies of the legal categories "citizen" and "alien." 
I will first discuss some of Aleinikoff's arguments concern-
ing citizenship and then turn to the explicit issue of "sover-
eignty." I should make clear at the outset, though, that any po-
litical system, such as our own, that is founded on the popular 
sovereignty of "We the People" must necessarily have some spe-
cial interest in 1) who exactly comprises the sovereign People; 2) 
whether citizenship is relevant to being a member of that sover-
eign entity; and, finally, 3) whether the demos, however defined, 
has truly unlimited power, at least in theory, to decide as they 
will, free of any binding normative constraints. 
I 
It is no small point that one of Aleinikoff's purposes is to at-
tack any strong reliance on the category of citizenship. The 
United States, quite obviously, was built by immigrants from 
other countries, most who came to this country voluntarily, 
though some most certainly did not. And most retained, for 
greater or lesser periods, some measure of identification with 
and loyalties to their "old countries." From one perspective, the 
United States, as a collective political entity following ratifica-
tion of the 1787 Constitution, has never been a genuine "nation-
state" inasmuch as that term suggests that each geographically 
organized polity (i.e., "state") consists even primarily, let alone 
exclusively, of a single discernable ethnos (i.e., "nation"). It has 
always organized itself, at least officially, around an ideology of 
what I have elsewhere termed "constitutional faith." 7 
Because of changes in American immigration law beginning 
in the 1960s, the United States continues, to a remarkable de-
gree, to be a nation of immigrants and, therefore, of resident 
aliens, some of them legal, some of them, of course, not. Con-
sider in this context a projection by the United States Census 
Bureau that the U.S. population in 2050 will be slightly over 400 
million,8 as compared with a current estimated population of 
7. See Len vinson, supra note 4. 
8. Population Reference Bureau, Human Population: Fundamentals of Growth Ef-
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294,107,506.9 The Bureau makes its estimates by assuming one 
birth every eight seconds, one death every 12 seconds, and one 
international migrant (net) every 25 seconds, with a net gain of 
one person every eleven seconds. 10 Of this projected growth, 36 
percent may result from immigration, with over 45 million new 
immigrants likely to be added next 50 years. Many will undoubt-
edly wish to become citizens (especially if the United States be-
comes increasingly tolerant of "dual nationality," which was 
barred by the Naturalization Act of 1795), ll but many, no doubt, 
will wish to proclaim only their initial political identity, whether 
for reasons of sentiment or because they expect to return to the 
"old country" after amassing a suitable nest egg here. 12 
There is no reason to believe that Aleinikoff objects to such 
developments; indeed, as already suggested, he welcomes 
strangers to our shores and is especially attentive to the possibil-
ity that such aliens will be discriminated against by a polity that 
views them as (mere) strangers. This leads him to offer a "decen-
tered" (pp. 9, 152, 177ff) conception of citizenship, the practical 
import of which is to lessen its relative importance as a predicate 
condition for enjoying a host of constitutional rights, ranging 
from classic "negative liberties" celebrating the "right to be let 
alone" 13 by the state to more affirmative rights to enjoy the 
benefits of a welfare state and, ultimately, the right to participate 
in institutions of self-governance such as voting. "[L]awful, set-
feet of Migration on Population Growth, at http://www.prb.org/content/navigationmenu/prb/ 
educators/human_populationlmigration2/migrationl.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
9. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. POPClock Projection, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/popclock (calculation of the American population as of Aug. 26, 2004). 
10. !d. 
11. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414. This act replaced the earlier Act of 
March 26,2790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, which did not require renunciation of prior loyalties. 
12. Though the "old countries" might be quite different from those one thinks of 
with regard to, say, early 20th century immigrants. See e.g., Indrajit Basu, Indians Return-
ing Home for Better Jobs, available at http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030905-105637-
9201r.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); Amita Vasudeva, Stay Or Go? Indians Can Now 
Advance by Returning Home, available at http://www.indusbusinessjoumal.cornlnews/004/3/ 
15/immigrationlstay-or.go.indians.can.now.advance.by.retuming.home-634375.shtml last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2005). 
13. "[The makers of our constitution] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the gov-
ernment, the right to let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men." Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added). Central to Aleinikoffs inquiry is whether Brandeis's reference to 
"Americans" should be read as having real bite, under the legal maxim inc/usio unis .. . , 
or whether it is simply an acknowledgment that the United States constitution does not 
apply extraterritorially. If one adopts this latter meaning, then "Americans" can legiti-
mately be read as "anyone within the territory to which the United States Constitution in 
fact applies." 
2004) BOOK REVIEWS 605 
tied members of a polity are entitled to consideration from, and 
perhaps participation in, the political system that exercises 
power over them .... [O)nce an immigrant is admitted and takes 
up permanent residence in the United States, discrimination on 
the basis of alienage alone begins to appear arbitrary" (p. 174) 
and, therefore, unconstitutional. "State laws excluding aliens 
from opportunities should be seen as no more legitimate than 
laws excluding redheads" (id.). 
What this means, obviously, is that citizenship can no longer 
be viewed as a necessary (though, presumably, it remains a suffi-
cient) condition for the enjoyment of a variety of rights (includ-
ing, possibly, participation rights) within the American polity. 
He views as "too binary" the distinction between citizen and 
alien, in which the "first status is accompanied by full member-
ship rights, the second by only those political and social rights 
that a beneficent sovereign [the "We the People" that presuma-
bly consist only of the citizenry) grants to its guests" (p. 147). In 
place of the binary distinction, Aleinikoff offers the notion of 
"denizenship" to address the rights that should be enjoyed by 
"lawful residents who participate in and contribute to the social 
and economic life of a community" (id.). 
Aleinikoff explicitly renounces the claim "that we have en-
tered a postnational world where, as Yasemin Soysal has argued, 
the legitimacy of the nation-state is grounded on its conformance 
with international human rights principles rather than on popu-
lar sovereignty" (p. 179). It is not clear to me, though, why he is 
not more sympathetic to Soysal, 14 especially inasmuch as he 
clearly wishes to emphasize one's status as a "person" rather 
than a "citizen" when, for example, interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment. He fully agrees with Alexander Bickel's laconic 
observation that citizenship "is a simple idea for a simple gov-
ernment" and is thus unsuited to the considerably more complex 
world within which we live (and, for that matter, have always 
lived). (53) 15 One might well object, for example, to Dred Scott 
not only because of its racist assumption that blacks are incapa-
ble of becoming American citizens, but also because of its (not 
so) latent assumption that only citizens can be members of the 
American constitutional community and, therefore, entitled to a 
full panoply of rights (one of which, for Taney, is the right to 
14. See YASEMIN N. SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND 
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994). 
15. Quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 54 (1975). 
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bear arms). 16 But one should also recognize, for better and 
worse, that Taney's argument sounded deeply in the theory and 
logic of "popular sovereignty." Although we can rejoice that the 
opinion was "overruled," as it were, by the first sentence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 17 one can relatively easily conceive of a 
counter-history whereby a less liberal United States placed into 
its text an explicit statement, as with the Nationalization Act of 
1790, that only whites could be citizens. 18 If one adopts a certain 
reading of the Constitution only because it is, in fact, the best 
understanding of what that particular document commands, then 
that implies, as a logical correlative, that the Constitution could 
be quite different, possibly committed to completely opposite 
values, if only the relevant sovereign so commanded. 19 But if one 
16. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (29 How.) 393,417 (1857). 
17. Though one should note the section one, with its reference to the "privileges or 
immunities of united states citizenship," very definitely seems to suggest that being a citi-
zen is a predicate condition to enjoy such "privileges or immunities." 
18. See ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN 
U.S. HISTORY (1997), in which he emphasizes the extent to which "attributionist" theo-
rists of American identity have more often taken on racialist overtones (i.e., the impor-
tance of being white, see especially Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (29 How.) 393, 417 
(1857)) than traditional "nationalist" ones. For a contemporary version of the argument 
about the centrality of preserving a distinctive kind of American nation-state, see 
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES To AMERICA'S 
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004) (bewailing increasing presence of Hispanics, particularly of 
Mexican descent, in American life). 
19. See, e.g., Hao Wang, REFLECTIONS ON KURT GO DEL 115 (1987) 
In connection with the interview for his US citizenship, he once told me that for 
this occasion he had studied how the Indians had come to America. Einstein 
and O.Morgenstern were his witnesses, and Morgenstern has told different 
people about aspects of the event. The following account is given by H. Ze-
manek and E. Kohler (see Zemanek's report, Elektronische Rechenanlagen, vol. 
5, 1978, pp. 209-211). Even though the routine examination G was to take was 
an easy matter, G prepared seriously for it and studied the US Constitution 
carefully. On the day before the interview G told Morgenstern that he had dis-
covered a logical-legal possibility of transforming the United States into a dicta-
torship. Morgenstern saw that the hypothetical possibility and its likely remedy 
involved a complex chain of reasoning and was clearly not suitable for consid-
eration at the interview. He urged G to keep quiet about his discovery. 
The next morning Morgenstern drove Einstein and G from Princeton to 
Trenton. Einstein was informed; on the way he told one tale after another, to 
divert G from his Constitution-theoretical explanations, apparently with suc-
cess. At the office in Trenton, the official in charge was Judge Philip Forman, 
who had inducted Einstein in 1940 and struck up a friendship with him. He 
greeted them warmly and invited all three to attend the (normally private) ex-
amination of G. 
The judge began, 'You have German citizenship up to now.' G interrupted 
him, 'Excuse me sir, Austrian.' 'Anyhow, the wicked dictator! but fortunately 
that is not possible in America.' 'On the contrary,' G interjected, 'I know how 
that can happen.' All three joined forces to restrain G so as to turn to the rou-
tine examination. 
Godel and the Constitution of the United States, available at http://www.sm.luth.se/-torkeU 
eget!godeUconstitution.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
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truly regards certain rights as "fundamental," one should admire 
the post-World War II German Constitution far more than the 
United States Constitution inasmuch as the former made certain 
of its human dignity provisions unamendable.20 It also follows, 
though, as an equally logical correlative, that this involves reject-
ing a robust notion of sovereign legal power in favor of overarch-
ing substantive norms. It is, perhaps, unfair to criticize Aleinikoff 
for not writing an even more ambitious book on political and 
constitutional theory than the very interesting one that he did 
write. That being conceded, it should be clear that more needs to 
be said about the relative weight he accords, on the one hand, to 
a sovereign, popular or otherwise, and, on the other, to "funda-
mental norms," whether derived from natural law or the opera-
tive conventions of the contemporary international human rights 
movement.21 
I have little trouble agreeing with most of Aleinikoff's sub-
stantive arguments. But I strongly suspect that at least some 
readers will be less sympathetic to his generous and inclusive ap-
proaches toward the treatment of aliens than they might have 
been in, say, August of 2001.22 One can easily forget that George 
One might assess the implications of this story, involving one of the great mathema-
ticians of the 20th century, in the context of Carl Schmitt's discussion of the implications 
of a constitution's allowing for the possibility of amendment (and therefore repeal) of 
constitutional provisions that are deemed to guarantee "fundamental rights." See CARL 
SCHMITI, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 39-58 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. & ed., 2004). All 
assertions of popular sovereignty can be redescribed as a decisionist "triumph of the will" 
of the relevant decision-making body. That, as in the united states constitution, it takes 
an extraordinary majority to amend the constitution is, Schmitt argues, only a procedural 
hurdle, as it were, that, nonetheless, still testifies to the subordination of the ostensible 
fundamental norm to the plenary-i.e., "willful"-power of the relevant extraordinary 
majority. 
20. See Grundgesetz "basic law" of Germany Article 79(3), available at http://www. 
lib.byu.edu/-rdh/ eurodocs/gerrnlggeng.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (The subsection 
reads "An amendment of this basic law affecting ... The basic principles laid down in 
articles 1 and 20, is inadmissible"). Article 1 is as follows: 
(1) the dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all 
state authority. 
(2) the German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable hu-
man rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. 
21. This is not the proper venue to discuss the theoretical foundations of the human 
rights movement, i.e., whether such rights are indeed "natural" rights cognizable through 
the use of some form of sheer reason or, rather, the resultant of a complex process that 
produces conventional norms. 
22. I should note, however, in Peter Spiro, The Impossibility of Citizenship, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1492 (2003) (reviewing T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF 
SOVEREIGNTY (2002)), Spiro takes Aleinikoff to task for being too caught up in the im-
portance of being a citizen. One gathers that Spiro would, in substantial respects, simply 
ehmmate, rather than merely "decenter," the concept as a central part of our analytic 
structure. 
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W. Bush and Mexico's President Vicente Fox were developing a 
close relationship in early 2001 around the call for a more wel-
coming policy by the United States with regard to immigrants 
from Mexico. Such policies-and the relationship-were among 
the casualties of September 11. The United States has, since 
then, made it much more difficult for foreigners to enter into the 
country, and it would occasion little surprise if such xenophobia 
started manifesting itself in public discussions of more general 
immigration (and citizenship) policy. After all, it was their fears 
of aliens infected by the spirit of the French Revolution that led 
Federalists to pass not only the Alien Act that allowed summary 
deportation of aliens deemed "unfriendly" by the Executive 
Branch, but also a new naturalization act that extended to 14 
years the waiting period required to become a citizen.23 This was 
changed back to five years by their Jeffersonian successors, 
which has remained the requirement since then. But manipulat-
ing the waiting period is only one way that "we the citizenry" 
might wish to make life more difficult for "them the aliens." 
One of Aleinikoff's interests, obviously, is the distinction we 
draw between citizen and non-citizen. But he is also interested 
in, and has extremely illuminating things to say about, certain 
people who are, beyond doubt, "citizens," but who are, nonethe-
less, not easily folded into that completely general (and imper-
sonal) concept. Thus he offers important discussions of the status 
of American Indians, all of whom were awarded statutory citi-
zenship in 192424 and of Puerto Rico, who received statutory citi-
zenship in the Jones Act of 1917.25 I could not agree more that 
the central foci of Aleinikoff's book- aliens, American Indians, 
23. See Naturalization Act of June 18, 1798, 1 Stat. 566. 
24. Obviously, some citizens had become citizens prior to that time, sometimes be-
cause of treaties, but the supreme court had held, in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), 
that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of how it might be in-
terpreted by the untutored reader who sees that citizenship is assigned to anyone born 
"within the jurisdiction" of the united states, did not in fact apply to reservation-born 
American Indians. For those interested in high theory, it is an interesting question 
whether Elk a) was wrongly decided (even though one might well believe that many res-
ervation Indians, who considered themselves oppressed victims of an illegitimate occupa-
tion, might have had no desire to become American citizens, by birthright or otherwise), 
or 2) even if rightly decided at the time, is no longer valid, so that congress is, for exam-
ple, without power to repeal the 1924 Act. 
25. See Jones-Shafroth Act of March 2, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951. In-
deed, I am happy to acknowledge the seminal role played by Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and 
the Constiwtion: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST. COMM. 15 (1994), in the devel-
opment of fascination with the constitutional status Puerto Rico (and Puerto Ricans). See 
Sanford Levinson, Why The Canon Should Be Expanded To Include The Insular Cases 
And The Saga Of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMM. 241 (2000). 
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and inhabitants of American territories-should play a far 
greater role in the standard teaching and thinking about Ameri-
can constitutional law than is in fact typically the case. That all of 
these tend to be excluded from the "canon" of American consti-
tutional law, at least as taught in most classrooms and instanti-
ated in most casebooks, 26 is surely unfortunate. As Aleinikoff 
demonstrates, the "plenary power" doctrine has served to limit 
(and, as a conceptual matter, perhaps simply erase) the enjoy-
ment of any genuine "sovereignty" on the part of tribes, as well 
as of the "territories" of the United States. And, as my colleague 
Sarah Cleveland has demonstrated, one finds in regard to aliens, 
Indians, and territories assertions of "inherent power" that belie 
the notion that ours is a Constitution establishing a national gov-
ernment with only assigned powers.27 Nor, of course, are these 
arguments of interest only to constitutional historians. 
Constitutional arguments made over a century ago in the 
first great examination of the American Empire that was gained 
in the late-19th and early-20th centuries continue to structure 
discussion of the status of American Indians and of the Puerto 
Rican residents of what is sometimes described as the world's 
largest remaining colony. American Indians at least enjoy an in-
dividual right to participate in elections for national officials 
even if, obviously, they have no right of collective representation 
similar to the American states. As to Puerto Rico, however, Al-
einikoff aptly quotes Judge Jose Cabranes's: "[N]o word other 
than 'colonialism' adequately describes the relationship between 
a powerful metropolitan state and an impoverished overseas de-
pendency disfranchised from the formal lawmaking processes 
that shape its people's daily lives" (p. 93). But these century-old 
arguments are also of great import in trying to determine the 
rights enjoyed today by detainees of the American government 
26. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1999). I am pleased to note that the casebook that Balkin and I co-
edit (with Paul Brest and Akhil Reed Amar) includes discussions of both Elk v. Wilkins 
and the status of Puerto Rico. See BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING 256-258,297-309 (2000). 
27. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent In Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Terri-
tories, And The Nineteenth Cenlllry Origins Of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. (2002) (an invaluable book length article which most certainly should be 
read by anyone interested in the questions that Aleinikoff raises in his book). Although 
the book is certainly historically informed, it is ultimately far more "prescntist" in its ori-
entation than is Cleveland's remarkable exercise in historical excavation. The general 
point about "inherent" powers as a complement to the more commonly emphasized "as-
stgned" powers is dramatically illustrated in Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., the Chinese exclu-
SIOn case, where justice field upholds the relevant congressional legislation entirely on 
mherent power grounds. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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incarcerated at the Guantanamo naval base in Cuba. Much of 
the Bush administration's claims as to the latter turned on ar-
cane theories of whether the United States in fact enjoyed "sov-
ereignty" over the Cuban base that, legally at least, is only 
"rented" (albeit in perpetuity) from Cuba. So this brings us to 
the central issue of what we might, in fact, mean by the notion of 
"sovereignty." 
II 
Tribal sovereignty means that; it's sovereign. I mean, you're 
a-you're a-you've been given sovereignty, and you're 
viewed as a sovereign entity. And, therefore, the relationship 
between the federal government and tribes is one between 
. . . 28 
sovereign entities. 
Although many of us might feel a certain schadenfreude at 
George Bush's remarkably bumbling answer to a question about 
the meaning of tribal sovereignty in the 21st century, we might 
ask ourselves how much better we would have done, before an 
audience of thousands of journalists, in making sense of the con-
cept in today's world. After all, Justice Thomas recently de-
scribed "Federal Indian policy," altogether accurately, as 
"schizophrenic,"29 not least because, as he wrote, "[t]he Federal 
Government cannot simultaneously claim power to regulate vir-
tually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic legis-
lation and also maintain that the tribes possess anything resem-
bling 'sovereignty."'30 The "cannot" here speaks to logic, not to 
28. President George W. Bush, President's Remarks to the Unity Journalists of 
Color Convention (Aug. 6, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004 
/08/20040806-l.html. 
The context is described in the following: 
It didn't sound like a hard question. After George w. Bush delivered a tepidly 
received address to a convention of minority journalists, a native-American edi-
tor from the Seattle post-intelligencer asked, "What do you think tribal sover-
eignty means in the 21st Century?" As President and a former Governor, the 
journalist said Bush had a "unique experience, looking at [the issue] from two 
perspectives." The President fumbled .... As Bush rambled, looking like a 
schoolboy unprepared at the front of the class, many of the hundreds of Asian, 
Black, Native American and Hispanic journalists gathered before him ... well, 
snickered. 
Marcus Mabry, A Tale of Two Candidates, at http:l/msnbc.msn.corn/id/5633644/ 
site/newsweek/ (Aug. 7, 2004). 
29. U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). See generally 
Symposium: United States v. Billy Jo Lara: A Constitutional Crisis In Indiana Law? 28 
AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 269-325 (2004). 
30. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196. 
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experience,31 since, of course, "the history[, including caselaw,] 
points in both directions"32 and thus allows well-trained lawyers 
to make exactly such schizoid arguments. 
Aleinikoff offers his book as a contribution to "a nascent 
field of inquiry I will label 'sovereignty studies"' (p. 4). He notes 
that the word "sovereignty" is usually used, in courses on 
American constitutional law, to refer only to the conundrum of 
federal-state relations. I would add that the primary function, 
even if not purpose, of discussing the "dual sovereignty" of state 
and nation is to confuse students and making them feel that the 
central tenets of American constitutionalism are indeed nearly 
impossible to grasp. 
Early in my own course, for example, I ask a student to read 
aloud the first paragraph of Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland/ 3 in which he begins by referring to "the defendant, a 
sovereign state. "34 I always stop and ask the hapless student to 
describe what Marshall could possibly mean by referring to 
Maryland as a "sovereign state"; after all, the overwhelming 
message of the case, apparent even to its most dimwitted read-
ers, is that it lacks a central attribute of sovereignty, which is the 
ability to tax at will. Surely McCulloch stands for the proposition 
that Maryland retains, at best, only a "semblance of sovereignty" 
rather than what any self-respecting political theorist, at least at 
the time, would have defined as "real" sovereignty, i.e., the 
power to govern but not to be governed in turn by some pur-
portedly "higher" authority. Someone less generously disposed 
to Marshall might claim that the first sentence is simply a scam, 
in which the crafty Chief Justice, having deftly picked Mary-
land's pocket, attempts to reassure Marylanders that it is suffi-
cient that they still have the wallet that once contained hard cur-
rency. I sometimes suggest to my students that they might inflect 
the adjective "sovereign" with the tone that one uses when 
speaking sarcastically. (Perhaps one should simply add, "Yeh, 
right!") 
The harsh reality, though, is that most students have no idea 
what the word means or meant, not least because few of them 
have had even a moment of systematic training in political the-
ory. They are, in fact, not dimwitted, but uneducated. It would 
31. See, of course, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1880). 
32. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196. 
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
34. !d. at 400. 
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be like asking a typical American to read a "simple" street sign 
that happens to be written in the Cyrillic or Hebrew alphabets. 
A major purpose of beginning the course as I do is both to 
introduce the concept and to emphasize its absolute centrality-
at least as an "essentially contested concept"35 -to a number of 
crucial constitutional debates that continue up to the present 
moment at both home and abroad. One of these debates, it 
should go without saying, is whether the concept is even useful in 
a contemporary world of inevitably interlinked states.36 Whether 
it is useful is, in a way, almost beside the point inasmuch as "sov-
ereignty" seems to be a word that we seem unable to extirpate 
from our vocabularies. As my friend and frequent co-author 
Jack Balkin suggested some years ago, there are certain terms 
(or what he called "nested oppositions") that, Phoenix-like, re-
vive from their apparent deaths because we cannot, as a practical 
(pragmatic) matter, do without them.37 One can cheerfully de-
molish the "public-private" distinction, for example, and then 
find oneself referring, say, to "private property" as if it is a 
meaningful legal concept (which, of course, it is). The same is 
probably true of "sovereignty." No cultural or political tradition 
that, like ours, emphasizes such notions as personal "autonomy" 
or collective "self-determination" could easily do without the 
term. We might well agree, three days a week, with the criticisms 
leveled by analytic philosophers, social psychologists, or political 
scientists at their semantic utility even as we find ourselves evok-
ing the language of autonomy or sovereignty three other days 
(while resting on the seventh day from our intellectually stress-
ful- perhaps even schizoid-labors). 
All of us, therefore, should join Aleinikoff's call-indeed, 
he describes it as his "central thesis"- for "a constitutional law 
for the twenty-first century" that exhibits "understandings of 
sovereignty and membership that are supple and flexible, open 
to new arrangements that complement the evolving nature of the 
modern state" (p. 5). Since any such understandings would de-
pend, as illustrated in Semblances of Sovereignty itself, excavat-
ing many aspects of American constitutional history, this would 
invariably provide what might even be described as a better way 
of understanding 19th and 20th century American constitutional 
35. See WILLIAM W. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10 (1983). 
36. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). 
See also PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 
(Krasner ed., 2001 ). 
37. See J. M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990). 
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developments as well as enabling us to make more sense of our 
likely futures. I will, in the remainder of this review, discuss 
some of the potential ramifications of turning (or returning) to 
"sovereignty" as a central focus on theoretical analysis. This dis-
cussion will be necessarily truncated inasmuch as full considera-
tion would merit a book in itself. 
III 
"By 'sovereignty'," Aleinikoff writes, "I mean the supreme 
legal authority in a national state" (p. 4). He cites F. H. Hinsley, 
who defines "sovereignty" as "the idea that there is a final and 
absolute political authority in the political community ," though 
Hinsley immediately goes on to note that "everything that needs 
to be added to complete the definition is added if this statement 
is continued in the followini words: 'and no final and absolute 
authority exists elsewhere"'3 One way of dissolving the paradox 
inherent in Hinsley's complete definition is to distinguishes be-
tween "sovereignty" as a normative claim of legal authority, in-
cluding "absolute" authority, and the quite different use of "sov-
ereignty" as what Stephen Krasner labels a synonym for 
"control," which is a far more descriptive in its thrust.39 The 
world is rife with perfectly plausible claims of moral or legal 
right that are, however, ignored by those with superior power 
(even if not moral or legal authority). But, of course, it would 
also be accurate, particularly in the contemporary world, to read 
Hinsley as suggesting that even normatively there is no truly "fi-
nal and absolute authority" inasmuch as well-founded legal 
claims may themselves be in tension. The international system 
may be organized into what are sometimes called Westphalian 
states that are described as "sovereign," able, that is, to make 
decisions free from (presumptively illegitimate) outside inter-
vention. However, the rise of the international human rights 
movement, strongly rooted in such legal documents as United 
Nations conventions and the like, have made more than respect-
able the notion of "humanitarian intervention," even if there is 
distinct disagreement about the particular states (Serbia, Iraq, 
Sudan ... ) who can no longer claim the traditional right of "sov-
ereign states" to be free from external intervention "merely" be-
cause of their mistreatment of their own population. What ex-
plains humanitarian intervention in, say, Iraq and not Ruanda is 
38. See F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (1966). 
39. See PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 36, at 10. 
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not a plausible claim that the legal merits were stronger in the 
former than the latter. It is all (and merely) a question of politi-
cal will, a decision by the now seemingly sovereign international 
community. 
Aleinikoff is, of course, well aware of such points. He joins 
Neil MacCormick in suggesting that "today no state in western 
Europe is, in a classical sense, sovereign" (p. 91), and he calls for 
a "new understanding of sovereignty" (p. 92) that would accept 
the conceptual (and practical, of course) reality of "overll'\pping 
and flexible arrangements attuned to the complex demands of 
enhanced autonomy within a broader regulative system of gen-
erally applicable constitutional and human rights norms" (id.). 
Similarly, he suggests "that both sovereignty and membership 
need to be reconceptualized in less rigid terms if we are to estab-
lish a political regime that overcomes historical subordination 
and justly rules over the territory and inhabitants of the United 
States. An America open to such flexibility will bespeak a (typi-
cally American) resilience and optimism appropriate for the new 
century" (p. 183).40 Although one could read this last comment 
as referring exclusively to the "historical subordination" visited 
upon American Indians or the inhabitants of conquered (or, as 
in the case of the Virgin Islands, bought) territories, the overall 
thrust of his book makes it clear that he is equally concerned 
with the status of immigrants who can make no plausible claim 
to being the victims of past misconduct by the United States. 
These latter persons must rely on basically ahistorical arguments 
of liberal equality. In any event, our task, according to Al-
einikoff, is to develop what perhaps we should call a "post-
classical" sense of "sovereignty" that has genuine analytic bite. 
As a matter of brute fact, we discover how "biting" any 
given analytic scheme is when states (or other relevant political 
entities) conflict.41 After all, should they wish to cooperate, as by 
entering into the World Trade Organization, nothing within the 
inherent logic of "sovereignty" prevents this, though, of course, 
some critics argue that it is unwise for "sovereign states" in ef-
fect to agree to waive aspects of their sovereign authority (and, 
therefore, as a logical matter, become "less sovereign" than they 
40. As suggested earlier, one might wonder, in 2004, whether America is better de-
scribed as "optimistic" or panic-stricken at the dire threats posed by terrorists. 
41. This is the real benefit of the "case analysis" that remains so pervasive in legal 
education. No one can seriously believe that it necessarily leads to Langdell-like "doc-
trines" that can simply be applied to future cases, but it does tend to sharpen one's sense 
about what in fact is at stake in any given controversy involving competing values. 
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had been). But, of course, this is nothing more than the public 
equivalent of an ordinary contract, whereby, at least within the 
conceptualizations of liberal political thought, sovereign indi-
viduals accept sometimes unwise limitations on their autonomy 
that would, in the absence of such voluntary agreement, indeed 
be illegitimate. 
"Sovereignty" is invoked when cooperation breaks down, 
when suspicion and even paranoia replace a mood of amity that 
transcends traditional divisions. It is at this point that one might 
well be suspicious of arguments that leave one with only "sem-
blances" of sovereignty.42 Consider the argument, within the 
context of abortion rights, whether the so-called "undue burden" 
standard leaves women with sufficient "semblances" of personal 
autonomy. Within any particular controversy, a woman either 
has a (sovereign?) right to terminate her pregnancy or the state 
has the (sovereign?) power to prevent that and therefore compel 
carrying the fetus to term. To tell a woman who wants an abor-
tion that she cannot have one, but that she nonetheless retains 
"semblances" of her right to reproductive autonomy may sound 
like a bad joke, unless she is an unusually well-trained and so-
cialized lawyer. 
A central question, of course, is who gets to decide what 
constitutes the "undue burden." Is it the obviously self-
interested particular woman herself or an ostensibly "objective" 
and disinterested court that, in the United States, finds its ulti-
mate authority in a delegation from a distinctly inchoate "We 
the People" who have given legal life to the Constitution? But 
this is simply to open a Pandora's box of questions as to who 
constitutes the sovereign "People" in whose name the judges 
speak, not to mention the plausibility of viewing judges as the 
uncomplicated agents of the sovereign People. 
Aleinikoff notes that "most U.S. constitutional law scholar-
ship 'assumes the state.' Analysis about limits on the exercise of 
national power begins with an already constituted state, exercis-
ing authority over an already constituted body of citizens" (p. 4). 
No courses that I am aware of discuss the provenance of the 
42. This is not to say that Aleinikoff is satisfied with the "semblances" that he iden-
tifies; he most certainly is not, as is clearest with regard to Indian tribes. The point, 
though, IS that almost no one actually supports normatively-and even more certainly 
fmds plausible descnpt1vely-a classical "full and complete" sovereignty that indeed 
leaves the designated sovereign free to do anything and everything it wills. It is just the 
attempt to tame such a "triumph of the will" by placing fetters on the putative sovereign 
that makes the concept so slippery. 
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United States of America with regard to their secession from the 
British Empire in 1776. And very few courses (other than my 
own) even begin with serious discussion of the disregard by the 
Philadelphia Convention of the unique method of amending set 
out in Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation- unanimous 
consent of state legislatures. Instead, of course, Article VII states 
that the Constitution will spring into juridical life simply on rati-
fication by conventions (rather than legislatures) in only nine 
(rather than all thirteen) states. 
One defense of the Constitution's legitimacy, as alread_x 
suggested, is the sovereign power enjoyed by "We the People" 3 
to sweep aside any apparent legal fetters that operate only with 
regard to their agents rather than on "the People" themselves.44 
Yet, as Aleinikoff writes, "Exactly who We the People are and 
by what right the United States exerts sovereignty over a beauti-
ful and bountiful land are questions rarely examined" (p. 4), at 
least outside the confines of the Yale Law School. The most 
dramatic illustration of Aleinikoff's point, of course, concerns 
the legitimacy of secession,45 another widely untaught though al-
together fascinating subject. Secessionist arguments almost in-
evitably draw on one aspect of the appeal of sovereignty itself, 
which is the "right of self-determination" by a self-defined "we 
the people" who proclaim that they cannot achieve the blessings 
of self-government (or, commonly, that they are the victims of 
unjust laws) while sta~ing within a polity in which they are a 
(permanent) minority. 6 That such arguments are, with very rare 
exceptions, dangerous with regard to maintaining a stable politi-
cal order may only be evidence of the volatility attached to 
popular sovereignty. It is, perhaps, best understood as a mantra 
to be invoked rather than a concept to be taken with full seri-
ousness, unless, of course, the concept is "tamed." That is, we 
settle for "semblances" because the "real thing" would be much 
too dangerous. 
This may help to explain why Aleinikoff is, as a matter of 
fact, quite moderate in his counsel with regard to American In-
43. Which is, not at all coincidentally, the title of Bruce Ackerman's magisterial 
works on American constitutional development. 
44. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, 
in RESPONDING TO lMPERFECfiON: THE THEORY AND PRACfiCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 89 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (Ackerman's colleague, Amar, argues 
with regard to the legitimacy of amendment by plebescite). 
45. See Levinson, Perpetural Union, supra note 4. 
46. See, e.g., Christopher H. Wellman, A Defense of Secession and Political Self-
Determination, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 142 (1995). 
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dians and Puerto Ricans. Recognition of enhanced autonomy in-
terests by tribes and the territories is, obviously, not the equiva-
lent of declaring that, if dissatisfied, either the 210,000 members 
of the Navajo Nation47 or the approximately 3,900,000 residents 
of Puerto Rico48 are free, as a legal matter, simply to leave and 
join, say, Andorra (population 69,865), Liechtenstein (popula-
tion 33,436), and Monaco (population 32,270l9 as independent 
"sovereign" members of the United Nations. 0 Given that there 
is no serious support for the idea of Navajo secession, the exam-
ple is, of course, merely "academic" in a somewhat pejorative 
sense. Puerto Rico is far more complex; there has been, for more 
than a half-century, a vigorous Independencia movement that, 
however, has never gained the support of more than approxi-
mately 5% of the population. One may well doubt, though, that 
the United States would recognize a Puerto Rican "Declaration 
of Independence" even if it received majority support (which is 
more, of course, than the likely level of support enjoyed by the 
American Declaration in 1776). One may be especially confident 
that the United States would not recognize the right of an "inde-
pendent" Puerto Rico to conduct its own foreign and defense 
policy. 
But, of course, there are less dramatic examples than seces-
sion that, nonetheless, present problems for the constitutional 
analyst of sovereignty. Consider the notion of "regime change," 
a term much in the news these days. I am a great admirer of 
Bruce Ackerman's overall project, which is nothing less than try-
ing to understand the constitutional dimensions of the ways by 
which the United States ens?aged in significant transformation 
over the past two centuries. For Ackerman, the term "We the 
47. See Explore the Navajo Nation, at http://www.americanwest.com/pages/navajo2. 
htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
48. See U.S. Census Bureau, Puerto Rico Population Estimates And Components Of 
Growth: 2000-2001, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/pr200l.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2005). Although the population estimate at mid-year 2001 was only 3,839,810, I 
am quite confident, given the estimated increase of approximately 25,000/year, that 
Puerto Rico's population has now crossed the 3,900,000 barrier. 
49. All of the population figures come from CIA, The World Factbook, at http:// 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/an.html#people. I believe it is the case that 
Monaco is subordinate to France with regard to foreign and defense policy, so this may 
be an example only of a "semblance" of sovereignty. Still, I suspect that there are mem-
bers of the Navaho nation and, even more certainly, Puerto Rico who would enjoy hav-
ing their own seat in the U.N. 
50. United Nations, List of Member States, at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember. 
html (contains a current list of the 191 member nations of the United Nations). 
51. See Sanford Levinson, Transitions, 108 YALE L.J. 2215 (1999). Ackerman, of 
course, is not alone in this interest. See also especially Stephen Griffin, Constitutionalism 
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People" is no mere term safely buried in the dim recesses of our 
history. Instead, it refers to an ever-present sovereign power 
that, however dormant at any moment, can awaken and engage 
in the full display of its sovereignty, which comes close to the 
"absolutism" suggested by &at least one aspect of) Hinsley's 
definition discussed earlier.5 Though there may be practical 
"control" limits on the Ackermanian soverei¥:n people, as a 
theoretical matter their domain seems limitless. 3 "In America," 
Ackerman writes, "it is the People who are the sources of 
rights." What this means, among other things, is that only the 
process of constitutional amendment (whether the formal proc-
ess of Article V or the more informal process that Ackerman is 
attempting to discern) separates us from an amendment that 
would, say, establish Christianity as a state religion.54 That is, 
there is no notion of inherent "limits" on popular authority. The 
"voice of the People," at least when correctly ascertained, for 
Ackerman's United States, just is the equivalent of the "voice of 
God" for a more traditional theocrat. It should be clear, then, 
that there are distinctly Schmittian strains in Ackerman's consti-
tutional theory insofar as the "sovereign" always retains a "deci-
sionist" power to transform any given legal status quo in behalf 
of a new vision of what our situation requires. 55 
If one takes "We the People" seriously as an ongoing politi-
cal entity and, even more so, if one accords that People the kind 
of power that Ackerman celebrates, it is no small matter to de-
cide who is included within it. We are, necessarily, referring to 
those who enjoy a right to participate in the ultimate sovereign 
act of transforming the Constitution itself. It is a notorious truth, 
for example, that what might termed the "People as partici-
pants" in 1787 did not generally include women, let alone what 
we today call African-Americans (a term that quite literally 
would have made no sense to many people who shared Taney's 
view that, as an analytic matter, those of African descent could 
in the United States: from Theory to Practice, in RESPONDING To IMPERFECfJON: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 37 (Sanford Levinson ed., 
1995); STEPHEN GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM THEORY (1996); Stephen 
Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115 (1999). 
52. To be precise, "(f]or me, 'the people' is not the name of a superhuman being, 
but the name of an extended process of interaction between political elites and ordinary 
citizens. It is a special process because, during constitutional moments, most ordinary 
Americans are spending extraordinary amounts of time and energy on the project of citi-
zenship .... " 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 187 (1998). 
53. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 15 (1991). 
54. /d. at 14. 
55. See Levinson, supra note 51, at 2224 n. 77. 
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not be "American" in any meaningful sense). Perhaps readers of 
this review would define "the People", with regard to "negative 
liberties," as all "persons" within the country (or, for that mat-
ter, incarcerated in American-run institutions like Guantanamo), 
even if, paradoxically or not, we agree that aliens have no right 
as such to remain within the United States. And many of us, 
though, I suspect, fewer than is the case with regard to negative 
rights, might go along with such a broad definition concerning 
"affirmative" welfare rights. But far, far fewer, I am confident, 
would accept the proposition that non-citizens should, say, vote 
for or hold national office. At some point, the membership in a 
political community that is presumably signified by "citizenship" 
does seem to matter. 
It is not part of Aleinikoff's project in this book to discuss 
the broad theoretical questions raised by Ackerman, though, as 
indicated, it is certainly part of his larger project of "sovereignty 
studies." Where the issue does emerge within the present book is 
with regard to American Indian tribes. The Supreme Court, for 
example, has had several important cases examining their "sov-
ereignty" with regard to jurisdiction over non-members who 
commit crimes on triballands.56 Although the most recent case57 
affirms Congress's power in effect to return to tribes this quite 
fundamental attribute of sovereignty-after all, Texas's criminal 
jurisdiction is not limited to Texans who happen to commit 
crimes within Texas-earlier cases, rejecting tribal claims, em-
phasized the importance of (non)membership in delineating 
tribal rights. Justice Breyer's majority in this past Term's Lara 
opinion seems to rely ultimately on the very "plenary power" 
doctrine that gives Congress complete power to decide as it will 
with regard to the actual "sovereignty-as-legal-control" that can 
be enjoyed by American Indian tribes. It is only because the 
"real sovereign" vis-a-vis Indian tribes-the United States Con-
gress-decided either to "give" or to "return" this important 
semblance of sovereignty to the tribes that they possess it. (Does 
it really matter which verb is used, at least in the absence of an 
argument that Congress is without power to change its mind and 
once more displace the tribe of its sovereignty?) Does not the 
56.. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318, 322-323 (1978) (referring 
to a tnbe's "sovereign power to punish tribal offenders," derived from those "inherent 
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished"); Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) ("inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not 
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe"). 
57. U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
620 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:601 
asking of such questions simply reveal the truth behind Justice 
Thomas's description of the operative doctrine in this area as 
"schizophrenic"?) 
As Aleinikoff acknowledges, there are three possible justifi-
cations for the Court's historic emphasis on the importance of 
membership as a predicate condition for regulation by Indian 
tribes. One involves what he labels the "democratic deficit," by 
which he means the fact that American Indian tribes do not al-
low non-members to "vote in tribal elections, run for tribal of-
fice, or serve on tribal juries" (115).58 Yet Texas is not barred 
from punishing misbehaving Oklahomans or New Yorkers (nor 
the United States punishing foreigners), so something more than 
this "deficit" must explain tribal incapacities. 
So Aleinikoff suggests an important second consideration, 
which is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to become a "natu-
ralized" member of a tribe inasmuch as the sine qua non for 
membership appears to be "blood-based" (p. 117). "[T]he ethno-
racial basis of tribal membership has no parallel in sub-national 
political communities in the United States. Citizens may take up 
residence in any state (or territory) and by doing so acquire full 
membership rights" (id.). Thus I was, almost instantly, a Texan 
(at least juridically) immediately after moving to Austin from 
New Jersey. Moreover, "an underlying concern about descent-
based membership is consistent with the strong objections regis-
tered by the Court to race-conscious distributions of political 
power and economic opportunities" (id.). Still, as Aleinikoff 
notes, the Court has scarcely offered a fully coherent defense of 
its views about the importance of "blood-based" membership-
it has, for example, upheld preferences for Indians on the ground 
that they are "political" rather than "racial. "59 Instead, it has 
chosen to speak about the unfairness of subjecting litigants to 
trial "not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people,"60 
(117) which, among other things, suggests to some a potential 
third concern, which is accepting the full implications of what it 
means to live in "an increasingly multicultural United States" (p. 
115). Such implications would include not only the prospect of 
finding oneself in contexts where no one understands the (Eng-
lish) language that one is speaking, but also, and perhaps more 
58. See especially Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (lack of power to punish non-
members of a tribe). 
59. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
60. Quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-211 (1978) 
(which was in turn quoting Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556,571 (1883)). 
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ominously, being subjected to legal procedures that appear, in 
some profound sense, to be "alien," even if the persons imple-
menting them are in fact one's fellow citizens. One might, of 
course, think of the "pre-incorporationist" systems of criminal 
justice, though presumably one function (and probably purpose) 
of incorporation was precisely to overcome the "diversity" that 
accompanies any robust federalism and to replace it with a more 
homogeneous, "nationalized," sense of what fairness in criminal 
justice demands. It may be that one reason we so easily accept 
the subjection of visiting Texans to "New York justice" (or vice 
versa) is that the two systems, at least formally, are likely to be 
substantially similar, save for such realities, of course, as the le-
gal ability and propensity of Texas prosecutors and juries to im-
pose the death penalty. 
In any event, tribal sovereignty, however described, must 
mean some degree of genuine self-determination by "We the 
Navajos" or "We the Mohawks," and one must inevitably grap-
ple with the ways that Navajos or Mohawks (or any of the 562 
federally recognized Indian tribes)61 define their own communi-
ties, to the potential detriment of non-members. There is an ob-
vious potential paradox: To the extent that Aleinikoff empha-
sizes the "decentering" of national citizenship, then one might 
well wonder why one should support a highly "centered" notion 
of membership on the part of Indian tribes. 
One might simply take reliance on the "sui generis" status 
of "preexisting sovereignties" who were the victims "of conquest 
or colonialism" (p. 142) and thus accord to the Navajo Nation, 
whether or not it is fully independent, as having the right to have 
the same control over membership that is enjoyed by those 
states within the international system that rely on descent.62 The 
Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka has argued that in-
digenous victims "of conquest and colonialism" are entitled to 
some special concern that would not be justified if we were talk-
ing of voluntary immigrants.63 This is one way of justifying, for 
example, a greater sensitivity to the desire of the Navajo Nation 
to maintain its own culture within the American mosaic than to a 
61. See Federally Recognized Indian Tribes, at http://www.artnatam.com/tribes.html 
(July 12, 2002). 
62. Israel is probably the most notable example, though Irish citizenship is appar-
ently available to anyone who can demonstrate that one of his or her grandparents was 
an Irish citizen. (144) 
63. See, e.g., WILL KYMUCKA, MULTICULTURAL CiTIZENSHIP passim (1995). 
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parallel desire by, say, the Satmar Hasids.64 There is obviously 
something to be said for this distinction, but, just as obviously, it 
can be used to support a certain insensitivity to almost all groups 
that comprise the multicultural reality of many contemporary 
states. 
It most certainly matters, then, how any given tribe de-
cides who is a member, whether one is referring to the ability to 
participate in the community or, in the case of other tribes, tore-
ceive revenues accruing from gambling on Indian reservations. 
Few readers, I presume, believe that whites who happen to live 
on Indian reservations, as many do, have what might be termed 
an "affirmative right" to enjoy the boons attached to the profits 
from casinos. Moreover, it is obvious that many Indian tribes to-
day have an incentive to be chary in recognizing new members, 
since by definition this would increase the denominator of per-
sons sharing the gambling receipts. Would we necessarily be as 
tolerant of American Indian tribes as we are of other sovereigns 
in changing their membership laws to make it more difficult for 
newcomers to join? Recall in this context the Federalist change 
of rules that imposed a 14-year residence requirement in order 
to make it more difficult for ostensibly disreputable aliens to be-
come citizens of the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
So why do we maintain "sovereignty" as part of our con-
tinuing political and theoretical discourse? Might the answer not, 
for most Americans-whether liberal or conservative-lie in our 
particular conception of sovereignty, i.e., "popular sovereignty." 
What would it mean to say that a successfully constituted people, 
as a normative proposition, get, at best, only "semblances" of 
sovereignty? Is not that just to say that all particular communi-
ties-and their members-must recognize that they are indeed 
part of an overarching community that is itself sovereign because 
of the numerical priority of the whole against any of its parts? 
Does it matter that the actual notion of a "world community" is, 
at best, a sentimental fiction? Or are we (equally) tempted to say 
that, at the end of the day, one should adopt a classical liberal-
indeed, libertarian-perspective and reject the notion that any 
64. I have explored such questions in Sanford Levinson, On Political Boundary 
Lines, Multiculturalism, And The Liberal State, 72 IND. L.J. 403 (1997) (discussing Bd. of 
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), striking down the New York legislature's carving 
out of a school district with regard to educating children with special needs). 
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external agent possesses the power to impair the individual's 
sovereignty articulated in the notion of "inalienable" rights? 
So we must always ask what work the term "sovereignty" is 
doing in any particular argument. What is it a proxy for? In case 
of Indian tribes, it's presumably fairness to a group that was op-
pressed in the past and a way of making up for the oppression. 
Yet one is eager usually both to limit the inferences that can be 
drawn from any particular concern for Indian tribes and to em-
phasize as well (as Kymlicka does) the limits even on these tribes 
with regard to the potential oppression of "insiders." This is best 
signified, in the United States, by congressional passage in 1968 
of the Indian Civil Rights Act that imposed-because an earlier 
decision of the Supreme Court had held that the Bill of Rights 
did not apply within Indian tribes65 - the protections of the Bill 
of Rights (save for the Establishment Clause, interesting 
enough) on the internal government of all Indian tribes. 
Stanley Fish has written, with typical acerbity, of what he 
terms "boutique multiculturalism," which "will always stop short 
of approving other cultures at a point where some value at their 
center generates an act that offends against the canons of civi-
lized decency as they have been either declared or assumed" by 
the central tenets of those engaged in deciding the practical 
meaning (and limits) of multiculturalism.66 This is not to deni-
grate the "multiculturalist" enterprise or the attractiveness of 
many of Aleinikoff's arguments.67 But, at the end of the day (and 
of this review), one should recognize both that sovereignty ulti-
mately is doing work for other values not explicitly stated and 
that the particular degree-or "semblance"-of sovereignty that 
one actually supports is a function of one's political values. 
65. See Talton v. Mays, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
66. See Stanley Fish, Boutique Multiculturalism, in THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 
56 (1999), quoted in Rachel Levinson & Sanford Levinson, 'Culture,' 'Religion,' and the 
Law, in SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 316 (2003). 
67. Aleinikoff addresses similar issues in A Multicultural Nationalism?, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 1998, available at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww? 
sectwn=root&name= View Print&article ld=4 741. 
